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Abstract  
 
This paper deals with the efficiency of Norwegian toll companies. Efficiency and productivity are compared 
using different efficiency measurement approaches. The focus of the paper is to demonstrate differences in 
efficiency and productivity among Norwegian toll companies employing methodologies such as Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). DEA and SFA both represent 
alternative methods of estimating frontier functions and measuring efficiency of production, but whereas 
DEA involves the use of linear programming, SFA is based on econometric methods. Despite the differences 
in the assumptions underlying the assumptions of the two methodologies we find them to produce similar 
results. The main conclusions in the paper are: 1) there is a great variation in efficiency among the toll 
companies where the larger ones are the best performers, 2) there is clear evidence of unexploited economies 
of scale in the sector and 3) toll companies have over the period studied improved their productivities, 
mainly due to newer toll collection technologies. This suggests that toll companies could make significant 
savings by employing industry best practice. From the authorities point of view an important policy 
implication is that the organisational framework, with a large number of small and medium sized companies, 
should be reconsidered. By merging some of the toll companies, inherent benefits of scale economies could 
be exploited.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Tolls are used as an instrument to finance new road infrastructure throughout the world and the increasing 
share of toll financing compared to public finance and the increasing number of companies involved 
illustrates that toll financing and -collection has become an industry of its own. Norway provides an example 
of a country which relies heavily on tolls and currently over 40 percent of its total annual budget for road 
construction is made up of tolls. According to the newly released National Transport Plan for the years 2010 
to 2019, this percentage is expected to increase in the future. 
 
Toll financing is organised differently between countries. From pure commercial enterprises responsible for 
construction, maintenance and finance, through public private partnerships with varying degrees of risk 
sharing to not for profit companies established solely with the purpose of providing finance in order to get 
roads constructed faster – toll roads are organised in many different ways. What all toll roads have in 
common though, is a need to collect tolls from the motorists as efficiently as possible, i.e. to run the charging 
points or toll stations at a minimum of costs and to minimise disturbance of traffic while tolls are collected. 
From a commercial point of view, the costs of collecting tolls - the operating costs, reduce profit margins and 
increases the payment period of loans. Operating costs are real costs and are also important from a socio 
economic point of view – the higher the operating costs, the lower will the net present value of a toll 
financed road be. As stated by Amdal et al. (2007), all toll roads should provide a net benefit in social cost-
benefit analysis terms, generate substantial net revenues and be acceptable to a major proportion of the 
public. Minimising the operating costs is critical for meeting all these three basic criteria. 
 
Data on operating costs in toll companies are rare and often regarded as competition-sensitive information 
which is not readily available to researchers. In this context, Norwegian toll financing provides an interesting 
case. Here detailed cost data from over 40 toll companies operating in different geographical regions and 
employing different tolling technology are available to the authorities annually. This allows us to answer 
several interesting questions: These are: (1) Do companies operate as efficient as their peers? (2) Do they 
progress in their operations? (3) Which factors outside the toll companies control determine their 
inefficiency? And finally, but not least: (4) What could be done to improve the efficiency of toll companies? 
These questions should be of interest to toll companies, authorities and motorists alike. As tolls are removed 
as soon as possible once the costs of constructing the road are covered, this means that if toll companies 
operate efficiently then tolls can be removed even earlier. Because tolls are a cost to road users, their 
removal will incur benefits to roads user and to society. Studies of elasticities in 20 Norwegian toll projects 
suggests an average elasticity of -0.56, meaning that an increase in generalised costs due to tolls by 10 % will 
reduce traffic by 5.6 % (Odeck and Bråthen, 2008). Further, gauging the impact of factors that may influence 
efficiency such as the technology for toll collection may give additional information relevant for improving 
performance in the toll road industry. 
 
The literature on efficiency and productivity measurement of toll operations are rare even if tolling is 
practised widely throughout the world. However, a related issue that has been debated recently in the 
transportation literature is the operating costs of tolls; see for instance Prud’Homme and Bocajero (2005), 
Mackie (2005) and Raux (2005). In the Norwegian context that we relate to in this paper, Welde and Amdal 
(2006) and Amdal et al. (2007) have investigated the levels of operating cost per vehicle in the Norwegian 
toll road industry. They applied regression analysis using panel data and found that operating costs varied 
tremendously between 6 and 20% of gross revenues with the larger toll companies serving larger traffic 
levels having lower operating costs per vehicle served. Their results indicated that there may be 
inefficiencies in the sector and that economies of scale were most likely to be present. Odeck (2008) 
extended these studies, but in the context of efficiency and productivity measurement using Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). He verified the claims by Welde and Amdal (2006) and Amdal et al. (2007) 
to the extent that there are scale economies in the sector, there are potentials for efficiency improvements and 
added that toll companies have in fact improved their productivities over the years studied, possibly as a 
result of using new technologies for toll collection. The objective of this paper is to contribute further to the 
debate surrounding the performance of toll companies in Norway.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of the tolling industry in 
Norway. Section 3 assesses the potential for efficiency improvements in light of principal agent theories. 
Section 4 gives a brief a count of the theoretical model to be applied. Section 5 describes the data to be used 
in the analysis and Section 6 presents the results.  Concluding remarks are given in section 7.  
 
2. The organizational framework of Norwegian tolling  
 
Norwegian toll financing is often described internationally as a success story given that more than 100 
projects have been realized using tolls and given that new ones are constantly being proposed. Currently, toll 
financing of road projects account for about 40 % of the total road budget and indicates the popularity of this 
mode of finance. The organizational framework of the Norwegian mode of toll financing has been discussed 
extensively in the literature - see for instance Odeck and Bråthen (1997, 2002, 2004 and 2007), Amdal et al. 
(2007), Odeck (2008) and Bråthen and Odeck (2009). Thus, only the main properties of Norwegian toll 
financing are explained below. 
 
Each toll project is based on an initiative from the local municipality, local authorities or other members of 
the local community. This initiative is based on a real or perceived need for new roads in the area and will 
usually result in the founding of a toll company, organised as a limited liability company, non-recourse to the 
Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA). The toll company acts as an enthusiast and will, often 
along with local politicians, work to establish political acceptance for the project. Once the road project is 
realised, the role of the toll company is to operate the toll system, often through the employment of 
commercial toll road operators, and to administer the toll revenues.  
 
It should be noted that not all construction costs are covered by tolls. Some percentage of the cost, normally 
20–50 %, is supplemented with government funds. This percentage is proposed by the toll companies, 
evaluated by the NPRA and may be accepted and sanctioned by the parliament. Factors determining this 
percentage would include the level of traffic, total construction costs, and level of toll fees. There are also 
instances in which local authorities finance a certain percentage of the construction costs. Briefly 
summarized, the process by which toll companies come into being is as follows; see Odeck (2007): 
 
I. Local authorities represented by the local government, local road authorities and local interest groups 
(e.g., industrial organizations) foresee that a much-needed road project cannot be realized in the near 
future within the government budget. Therefore, they propose toll financing. 
 
II. The proposal for toll financing of the particular project is sent to the NPRA for evaluation of its socio-
economic and financial worthiness. The considerations are: (1) an application of toll financing should 
include the formation of a toll company to cater for the collection of funds, i.e., the down payment of 
the loan taken to fund the project and operation of the toll(s), and (2) the application includes a 
financial assessment proving that it is possible to repay the loan within 15 years of the start of toll 
collections. The rates are proposed by the local initiators but must be within an ‘acceptable’ range 
suggested by guidelines issued by the NPRA. 
 
III. Once approved by the NPRA, the proposal is forwarded to the Ministry of Transport, which prepares a 
bill to be tabled in Parliament. Once passed by Parliament, the toll company starts operation by taking 
up a loan to begin road construction. Typically, the collection of tolls starts after the road has been 
built. There have, however, been instances where tolls have been collected in parallel with road 
construction work. 
 
IV. Once in operation, toll companies are monitored by the NPRA according to guidelines issued by the 
Ministry of Transport and Communication. In other words, it is the NPRA that has the task of 
controlling the companies’ accounts to ensure that operations proceed in accordance with the 
guidelines. 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: The Norwegian toll industry 
 
The toll company is organised as a non profit enterprise and the share owners receive no dividends. For those 
unfamiliar with Norwegian tolling, the concept of not for profit involvement might be difficult to understand. 
There are, however, other parties involved in the Norwegian toll road industry that operate on a pure 
commercial basis. Figure 1 illustrates all the parties involved in the toll road industry. The NPRA is 
responsible for all roads construction and –maintenance through the use of private road contractors. Local 
toll companies provide the finance needed to get the roads constructed faster and national and/or 
international banks provide loans which normally are guaranteed by local or regional authorities, securing 
low interest rates. Toll station equipment is regarded as part of the road infrastructure and is contracted by 
the NPRA. This technology is then put at the disposal of the toll company which is responsible for collecting 
tolls. Over the last decade, toll companies have increasingly started to contract out the collection of tolls to 
commercial toll road operators. The dotted square in figure 1 illustrates the responsibility of the toll 
company. The main objectives of the toll company are thus: (1) secure loans for funding roads, (2) collect 
road tolls as efficiently as possible, i.e. keep the operating costs as low as possible and (3) see to it that funds 
collected are used for what they are meant, i.e. repayment of loans and to cover operating costs. In this paper 
we focus on tasks (2) and (3) and how these could be carried out as efficiently as possible.  
 
 The technology used for collecting tolls 
 
The next issue worth addressing is the charging arrangements that definitely influence the performance of 
toll companies. The collection of tolls in Norway was traditionally done manually where a toll, based on the 
size of the vehicle and number of passengers, was paid to a toll attendant. This allowed for a detailed prize 
differentiation but the collection itself was expensive for the toll companies and time consuming for the 
motorists. This triggered an interest in developing technological solutions that could reduce costs to both 
operators and users. Thus, in 1987, Norway became the first country in the world to deploy an electronic toll 
collection (ETC) system. The use of ETC systems was enhanced further by the opening of the toll cordons in 
Bergen, Oslo and Trondheim in the years 1987-1991. The use of electronic tags mounted on the windscreens 
of vehicles became widespread in urban areas. Today, Norwegian ETC is based on a national Dedicated 
Short Range Communications standard named AutoPASS which offers users full interoperability between all 
ETC systems in all Scandinavian countries. Currently over half of all Norwegian vehicles are equipped with 
an AutoPASS tag. 
 It should be borne in mind however, that even if all new toll projects are based on modern ETC system the 
system for toll collection in Norway differs between toll companies according to when they were opened. 
The systems in use among the toll companies considered in this paper can be classified as follows:  
 
1. Manual collection: Cash payment to toll attendants 
2. ETC/Manual collection: Majority of tolls collected electronically, but cash payment to toll 
attendants available to infrequent users without tags. 
3. ETC/Coin machines: As in (2), but toll attendants replaced by coin machines. 
4. AETC: All electronic toll collection. No cash collection, toll plazas replaced by gantries and all 
collection done electronically either through tags or invoicing of non-tag holders in arrears. 
 
As charging equipment is considered part of the road infrastructure, it is the Norwegian Public Roads 
Administration (NPRA) that determines which charging arrangement is to be used in each toll project. As 
such the objective of the toll companies is to operate the toll collection as efficiently as possible given the 
prevailing legal and technological conditions. 
 
3. The potential for inefficiency in the Norwegian toll road industry 
 
From the above, it is clear that Norwegian toll companies are heavily regulated, but given the differences in 
traffic levels and technology we expect to find huge variations in operating costs, as observed by Welde and 
Amdal (2006) and Amdal et al. (2007). The question is whether these variations are present because of 
differences in exogenous factors, or are they due to inefficiencies that could and should be corrected for. 
 
The reasons why inefficiencies arise have been discussed for decades and a relationship where a principal 
wants an agent (or a group of agents) to maximise the interests of the principal (Rees, 1985a, 1985b) is often 
used as a starting point. The problem for the principal is that he does not have access to the same amount of 
information as the agent. Instructing the agent hence becomes difficult, as the principal cannot observe all 
the actions of the agent. The relationship between the NPRA and the toll companies is often described as one 
between a principal and an agent. The toll companies act as agents for the NPRA in that they are established 
to finance a road project on behalf of the road authorities. With the huge number of toll companies, there will 
always be an element of asymmetrical information which complicates the NPRA’s monitoring of the 
companies. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) argue that the asymmetry of information inherent in principal agent 
relationships gives rise to imperfect incentives and therefore inefficiency. As the agent generally is far more 
knowledgeable about his company’s operations than the principal is able to be, he might be able to pursue 
different goals than those of the principal without the principal finding out. Poor incentive systems, 
inadequate control systems and a lack of competition could increase the challenges inherent in principal 
agent relationships. 
 
Although toll companies are mainly financial vehicles established to act in public interest, the incentive 
structure of Norwegian toll financing has been criticised (see OAGN, 1999; Welde et al., 2003; Bråthen and 
Odeck, 2009). If traffic growth in a toll project is higher than forecast and net revenues exceed expectations, 
toll collection will end and the toll company will be dissolved earlier than anticipated. It is not unreasonable 
to expect that the toll company’s management and its employees might want to carry on operations as long 
as possible. As Migué and Bélanger (1974) argue, the highest reward for a bureaucrat is the opportunity to 
enjoy “the quiet life”. What complicates the issue further is that poor performing toll companies will not 
have any economic consequences for the NPRA as inefficiencies will only result in the motorists paying 
higher tolls or tolls for a longer period then necessary. As Busch and Gustafsson (2000) argues, services 
financed by user fees will often have a lower productivity because of less control and follow up by the 
principal. 
 
The NPRA not doubt has a demanding task in monitoring and controlling the toll companies to ensure that 
they act in accordance with the objectives set out in the concession and operate as efficiently as possible. 
However, regardless of the toll companies opportunities to operate in their own self interest and regardless of 
possible opportunistic actions, with over 40 toll companies in operation it would be more surprising if they 
all were equally efficient than if variations existed. In this paper we aim to identify the better performing 
companies to facilitate learning and cost reductions to the benefit of users, toll companies and to society. 
 
4.  Methodology  
 
We use two different approaches: DEA and SFA to examine efficiency of Norwegian toll companies. The 
rationale for using two competing methods is counter check whether results received by one methodology 
can be confirmed by the other. We briefly describe each of the methodologies below. 
 
4.1 Data Envelopment Analysis ( DEA) 
  
The DEA method is regarded as one of the most successful techniques of efficiency assessment proposed by 
researchers in Management Science and Operations Research, as is evident by the diversity of its application 
in the last decade; see for instance Coelli (1995) and Seiford (1996) for recent reviews.   
 
DEA proceeds by defining the best virtual producer ( in this case, toll company) corresponding to each real 
producer, where the virtual producer does not necessarily exist, but is imputed from linear combination of 
the inputs and outputs of one or more efficient producers. If the corresponding virtual producers perform 
better than the real producer by producing more output with the same level of inputs or the same level of 
output with less input, then the real producer is inefficient.  It has been shown by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978, hereafter CCR) that the process of the finding the efficiency index for the real producer can 
be formulated as a linear programming problem.  
 
The original CCR formulation is non-flexible in the sense that it assumes constant returns to scale (CRS) in 
its production possibility set. Since we are also interested in exploring the assumption of variable returns to 
scale (VRS), the VRS formulation of Banker et al. (1984), hereafter (BCC), is also calculated this study. As 
it will be shown in equation (2) later, BCCs formulation makes it possible to calculate scale efficiencies 
more easily. The input oriented BCC formulation may be expressed as:  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where xo and yo respectively, denote the input and output vectors for selected units of the grain production 
industry. E1 is the input decreasing efficiency measure of unit o. j is the non-negative weight of unit J’s 
output and inputs that defines a comparison point on the frontier.  Restriction (1a) states that the efficiency-
corrected use of inputs (E1xo) must at least equal the amounts employed by the reference unit. Constraint (1b) 
states that the reference unit must produce as much output as unit j. Constraint (1c) restrict the best practice 
technology to permit a variable returns to scale (VRS). Note that this where the BCC’s formulation is 
flexible as compared to CCR’s formulation. For non-increasing return to scale (NIRS), the appropriate 
restriction is the inequality in (1c).  
 
By calculating three efficiency measures using these three restrictions, it can be determined whether a given 
producer is operating at decreasing, increasing or constant return to scale. The following general rule will 
then apply for determining the scale of a producer (see for instance Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell, 1985): 
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Note that condition (iv) in eq. (2) above is not a sufficient condition for decreasing returns to scale (DRS) 
unless condition (i) is not satisfied. The linear program (1) above is run sequentially for each of (n) grain 
producers. Technically efficient units are identified in units that have input and output slack vectors  s j
-  = 0 
and  s j
+  = 0 in addition to E = 1 at optimality.  These best practice units display either an optimal composite 
of inputs (or outputs) or a single exceptional input-output ratio. Less efficient units will obtain an E1 score of 
less than 1 and might have non-zero input or output slacks. In order to compute the output-oriented measure 
E2, the reciprocal of model (1) above may be considered. The objective is then to maximize output within the 
given finite stock of inputs available.   
 
There is however, a necessary caution when using DEA techniques. Since DEA yields a relative efficiency 
measure and defines a unit as inefficient by comparing combinations of input and output with other units, 
units operating with input-output quantities sufficiently far from the other units at both ends of the size 
distribution will be identified as efficient simply due to the lack of comparable units. Fortunately, problems 
of this kind are minimal when examining larger samples of units. This is because larger samples decrease the 
average level of efficiency, due to the positive probability of including more efficient outliers in the sample.  
 
4.2 The Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
 
Following well established conventions as those of Aigner and Chu (1968) and Meeusen and van de Broeck 
(1977), a stochastic frontier production function for the cross sectional data is specified as:  
 
                            ( ; )                                                                             (3)it it itY f X    
 
Where Yit denotes output of the ith firm in period t; Xit is a vector of functions of actual input quantities used 
by the ith firm in period t;  is a vector of parameters to be estimated; and it is the composite error term.  
The error is further defined as: 
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Where the vits are assumed to be independently and identically distributed random errors, which have normal 
distributions with mean zero and unknown variance v2.  The random variable, uit is assumed to have half-
normal distribution or exponential distribution.  In this model the observed output, Yit, is bounded above by 
the stochastic quantity, f (Xit;) + vit, where vit accounts for random variation of production outside the 
control of the individual unit.  
 
Given that the above stochastic model is in original quantities of production, the technical efficiency of the 
ith unit is defined by the following ratio: 
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This measure of technical efficiency for the ith unit is defined for a given level of inputs, specified by the 
vector Xit. If the model is in terms of logarithm of output, then technical efficiency of the ith unit is defined 
by:  
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Jondrow et al., (1982) have proposed that the technical inefficiency effect, uit be predicted by the conditional 
expectation of uit, given the composed error, eit = vit+ uit. 
  
There are several different frontier model formulations of this type depending on the specification for the 
uits, which are termed technical efficiency effects (See Coelli, 1996). The model used in this study is a 
variant proposed by Coelli et al. (1998), in which the technical efficiency effects are defined as:  
 
where Zit is a vector of explanatory variables associated with technical inefficiency effects;  is a vector of 
unknown parameters to be estimated and the Wits are unobservable variables which are assumed to be 
independently distributed, obtained by truncation of the normal distribution with mean zero and unknown 
variance 2, such that Uit is non-negative (i.e. Wit is greater/equal to -Zit.). The maximum–likelihood 
estimates of the parameters of the stochastic frontier model are readily obtained using the computer program, 
FRONTIER, version 4.1. The variance parameters are estimated in terms of parameters, s2 v2 +2 and 
=2 /s2. Given this model the hypothesis that technical inefficiency effects are not random are expressed by 
H0: =0, where =2 /s2. Further, the null hypothesis that the technical inefficiency effects are not 
influenced by the level of the explanatory variables in equation (3) is expressed by H0: ’=0, where ’ 
denotes the vector, , with the constant term 0, omitted, given that it is included in the expression, Zit. Note 
that if: =0, then the model equal to the traditional average response function which is efficiently estimated 
using ordinary least square regression. The test statistics are calculated as: 
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Where L (H0) and L (H1) are values of the likelihood functions under the null and alternative hypothesis, H0 
and H1, respectively.   
                                                               (7)it it itZ W  
 5. The data  
 
When measuring technical efficiency of production units the way we intend to do, important prerequisites 
include: (i) that the data includes clearly defined production units (companies), (2) that for each company 
there are outputs and inputs indicating the services produced and the resources used and most critical, (3) 
that the units (companies) being compared are comparable in the sense that they utilize the same types of 
inputs to produce the same types of services.  
 
The data we use in this paper were gathered from the annual data on toll operations reported by the 
individual toll companies to the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA) who is responsible for 
monitoring of the toll companies. The data have thus, undergone the scrutiny of the Auditors and are 
therefore highly reliable. All the data are from the accounting periods from 2003 to 2008; note that this data 
is not identical to those used by Odeck (2008) who covered the period 2001 -2004 hence, the data used here  
is newer. It must be added as we shall see that this data set includes also the technology in use for collecting 
tolls which was not considered by the above mentioned author.  
 
While the average number of toll companies in operation across the period we study was about 45, our data 
set contain only 20 of the toll companies representing about 45 % of toll companies at every point in time 
considered. There are reasons for doing this; we wanted a set of companies that have been in operation for a 
number of years so that productivity improvements or regress could be examined. Further, 45% is such a 
large percent warranting the deduction of useful information. 
 
Table 1 shows a summary of variables used in the analysis classified into inputs, outputs and exogenous 
variables. The output for toll companies are the annual traffic handled through tolls divided by the number of 
lanes served. The inputs are the operating costs and the administrative costs. The exogenous factors are 
variables, mostly dummy variables in nature that may be thought to impact efficiency but are not under the 
direct control of the companies. These include the age of the toll company, i.e. how long it has been in 
operation, percentage of vehicles using on board units and the collection system determined by the NPRA. 
Table 1 show that there is a great variation in the magnitudes of variables among toll companies. 
 
Table 1: Summary of variables 
 
  Mean S.D Min Max
Trafikk lanes(output) 582216 547136 49354 3087922
Operational cost‐Input(NOK) 18205167 30055397 115085 182938289
Administrative costs ‐Input(NOK) 580154 384380 48988 2048030
Exogenous variables
Age 8.51 5.53 0 23
Toll ring 0.25 0.43 0 1
Passenger payment 0.18 0.39 0 1
Competition 0.42 0.50 0 1
Full ETC 0.06 0.24 0 1
ETC/coin Machine 0.26 0.44 0 1
ETC/manned 0.46 0.50 0 1  
 
6. Empirical results  
6.1 Estimating the DEA and SFA models 
 
Because DEA discussed in the methodology section does not account for exogenous variables, which 
otherwise are included in the SFA model, the standard DEA model was modified. Thus, another way of 
revealing their impact is to regress them on inefficiency scores defined as 1 minus the efficiency 
scores. There are many approaches to regression of this type in the literature, see for instance 
Ruggiero and Vitaliano (1999) and Simar and Wilson (2007). In this paper, we use the approach 
proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007) which is the use of truncated regression.   
 
In estimating the SFA model we assumed a translog stochastic frontier production function with the 
following initial form: 
  Where ln denotes the natural logarithms, yit represents produced output for the i-th year, xi the 
inputs (i=-1,..,4), t the linear time trend (2003=1,…,2008=6), v and u are as before defined. 
The model for technical inefficiency effect was defined by: 
 
Where Di’s are the dummy variables and Wit is the disturbance term. The rest of variables included 
are as in the equation. Note that this equation is similar to that of the DEA truncated model with the 
difference that the independent variable in the DEA case is the efficiency score from the base 
model.  
 
In Table 2, the parameter estimates of the DEA-truncated model and the maximum likelihood 
estimation of SFA are reported. The first order and the second order coefficient for operating costs 
in the SFA model is found to be strongly significant. For the administrative costs, neither the first 
nor the second order coefficients are significant. These results indicate that operating costs are the 
major explanatory variable for the production of toll companies.  The results also show that both  
and  are significant.  
 
Turning now to the inefficiency model results reported at the lower part of the table, we find that 
the included variables impacts efficiency in the two models more or less alike with respect to the 
tolling technology whereby all the tolling technologies are significantly efficiency enhancing as 
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compared to pure manual tolling. Further, both methods concur that passenger payment is 
inefficient as a means of collecting tolls.  The methods do not however, conform to each fully. For 
instance, age of the toll company is significant according to SFA but not according to DEA, and the 
reverse is the case with toll rings.  
 
 Table 2: Parameter estimates of the DEA-truncated and SFA translog technical efficiency model 
 
6.2   Efficiency scores -comparing DEA and SFA 
 
Given these findings, the data described is used to investigate inefficiency among Norwegian toll companies.  
The average efficiency scores by each method are reported in Table 3. The Top panel of the table presents  
the scores by SFA while the lower panel the DEA results.  
 
Variables   parameter  coefficient standard‐error t‐ratio
Determinants of frontier
constant  0.44 0.12 3.79
ln(Operational  cost)  0.45 0.07 6.59
ln(Administrative costs)  0.10 0.11 0.94
ln(Operational  cost)2  0.12 0.06 1.86
ln(Administrative costs)2  0.07 0.24 0.28
ln(Operational  cost)ln(Administrative costs)  ‐0.17 0.10 ‐1.79
t  0.00 0.05 0.04
ln(Operational  cost) x t  ‐0.03 0.03 ‐0.94
ln(Administrative costs) x t  0.04 0.05 0.80
t2  0.00 0.04 0.00
Inefficiency model 
parameter  coefficient standard‐error t‐ratio   coefficient standard‐error t‐ratio
Const.  2.25 0.60 3.77 0.52 0.06 9.10
Age  ‐0.10 0.04 ‐2.35 0.00 0.00 1.00
Tollring(1=yes, 0=otherwise)  0.17 0.69 0.24 ‐0.28 0.06 ‐4.93
Passenger Payment(1=yes, 0=otherwise)  0.78 0.28 2.76 0.05 0.01 3.44
COMP(1=yes if competetive tendering, 
0=otherwise)  1.02 0.38 2.66 0.03 0.05 0.76
Full  ETC based (1=yes, 0=otherwise)    ‐4.08 0.75 ‐5.48 ‐0.33 0.11 ‐2.86
ETC based with coin machines(1=yes, 
0=otherwise)  ‐3.02 0.76 ‐3.99 ‐0.18 0.07 ‐2.49
ETC based and manned (1=yes, 0=otherwise)
 ‐1.96 0.32 ‐6.19 ‐0.10 0.05 ‐2.11
sigma‐squared  0.29 0.06 5.00 0.16 0.01 12.84
gamma  0.48 0.09 5.64
log l ikelihood function ‐71.89   47.84
LR test o fthe one‐sided error 77.41     46.98
DEA Truncated model 
Table 3: Average efficiency scores for DEA versus SFA 
 
The mean efficiency scores by the two methods are low at about 0.5 to 0.6 across all the years studied 
indicating a large potential for efficiency improvement in the sector. The score of 0.5 imply that an average 
toll company could have reduced its inputs (operating and administrative costs) by about 50 % and still be 
able to produce the same level of service as they do today. This result may seem far fetched however, the 
problem with many Norwegian toll companies is that they have relatively low traffic volumes and operate 24 
hours a day. Thus operating costs e.g., in terms of labour costs, are incurred even when there is no traffic 
being served. Obviously, a potential way of improving efficiency would be to reconsider operating hours.   
The standard deviation of the efficiency scores is large at about 17-30 % and reveals that there is a great 
variation in efficiency scores between toll companies and by the method applied; while some companies are 
a 100 % efficient others obtain very low scores.  
 
If we consider the average efficiency scores all the periods, it is observed that the two methods maps each 
other very well; mean efficiencies increase from 2003 – 2004, falls in the period 2004-2005, increases in 
period 2005 -2006 and the falls again in 2006-2007 and in 2007 -2008.  
  
So far the two methods confirm that there are large inefficiencies in the performances of the Norwegian toll 
companies. The next question to address is whether the two methods give the same results; it may be that 
they give averages that are close to each other, but the scores for the individual companies may be different. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average(all years)
Mean 0.561 0.618 0.617 0.686 0.663 0.646 0.632
S.D 0.218 0.208 0.213 0.240 0.209 0.210 0.174
Min 0.271 0.216 0.220 0.308 0.334 0.271 0.377
Max 0.993 0.970 0.991 0.983 0.987 1.000 0.905
No. of observations 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Mean 0.574 0.620 0.487 0.546 0.498 0.449 0.529
S.D 0.261 0.274 0.237 0.247 0.233 0.267 0.228
Min 0.086 0.151 0.140 0.158 0.144 0.129 0.167
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
No. of observations 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
DEA
SFA
This issue is examined closely in Figure 2 where we have plotted the efficiency scores by DEA versus SFA. 
The figure indicates that there is some positive correlation between the two approaches but that correlation is 
not clear-cut.  A Pearson correlation measure gave a significant correlation coefficient of 0.30. This 
correlation coefficient is low and a question may be asked as to why this is so. The answer is simple. These 
are two different approaches to the construction of frontiers from which efficiency scores are derived. What 
is of importance is that they both concur that approximately the same average inefficiency is present in the 
sector.  
 
Figure 2: DEA versus SFA efficiency scores. 
 
 
Now, another issue to consider is whether larger companies serving a larger amount of traffic and operating 
many toll stations are more efficient than others. Figure 2 show a plot of how the efficiency scores by the 
two approaches relates to the size of companies. 
 
 
Figure 3: relationship between efficiency scores and size of companies 
  
 
From Figure 3, there is no doubt that efficiency increases with attesting that larger companies are more 
efficient than smaller ones.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
The objective of this paper has been to analyze the efficiency and productivity of Norwegian non-profit toll 
companies established with the purpose of collecting funds for road investments. We have used two 
approaches: DEA and SFA to infer the level of inefficiency in the sector.  
 
  Our results reveal the following:  
 
1) A formidable potential for efficiency improvement exists in the Norwegian toll road industry and 
this potential varies to a great extent among toll the companies.  
2) The technology used for collecting tolls matter for the efficiency of companies to the effect that 
companies who use electronic tolling system in combination with manual/coin machines are more 
efficient as compared to those who only use manual collection systems. Further, charging passengers 
rather than only vehicles leads to more inefficiency.  
3) Finally, toll companies strive collectively to improve their productivities from one year to the other.   
A probable explanation for this is the pressure that has been exerted on companies to improve their 
performance.   
 
 The findings of this paper have some implications for decision makers. The authorities concerned with roads 
(the NPRA and the Ministry of Transport and Communication, in particular) have reason to reconsider the 
organizational framework of Norwegian toll companies. The major reason for this assertion is that there is 
strong evidence that economies of scale exist in the Norwegian toll road industry. A second recommendation 
is that the NPRA should provide guidelines on how toll companies can be run efficiently. Such guidelines 
should provide examples of best practice companies that more inefficient companies can learn from. The 
DEA framework used in this study readily reveals such best performances for the individual inefficient 
companies to compare with.  Finally, the use of ETC system in combination with manual should be 
encouraged by the NPRA and, the passenger payment is inefficient and should be discouraged.  
 
References 
 
Aigner, D.J. and Chu, S.F. (1968), “On estimating the industry production function”, American Economic 
Review, 58, pp. 826-839. 
 
Amdal, E., Bårdsen, G., Johansen K. and Welde M. (2007), “Operating costs in Norwegian toll companies: a 
panel data analysis”, Transportation, 34 (6), 681 – 695 
 
Banker, R.D., Charnes, A. and Cooper, W.W. (1984), “Some models for estimating technical and scale 
efficiencies in Data envelopment analysis”, Management Science, 30, 1078–1092. 
 
Berg, S.A., Førsund, F.R. and Jansen, E.S. (1991), “Technical efficiency of Norwegian banks:  The non-
parametric approach to efficiency measurements”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 2, 127–142. 
 
Bjurek, H. and Hjalmarsson, L. (1995), “Productivity in multiple output public services: A quadratic frontier 
function and Malmquist index approach”, Journal of Public Economics, 56, 447–460.     
 
Brocket, P.L. and Golany, B. (1996), “Using rank statistics for determining programmatic efficiency 
differences in data envelopment analysis”, Management Science, 42(3), 466–572. 
 
Bråthen, S. and Odeck, J. (2009), “Road Funding in Norway: Experiences and Perspectives”, International 
Journal of Sustainable Transportation, 3, 1-15. 
 
Busch, T. and Gustafsson, O. (2000): ”Slakk i offentlig sektor. En komparativ analyse av en privat og en 
offentlig renovasjonsvirksomhet”. In: Jønsson, S. and Larsen, B. (edts.): Teori & Praksis. Skandinaviske 
perspektiver på ledelse og økonomistyring. Jusist- og Økonomiforbundets Forlag, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 
Coelli, T.J. (1995), “Recent developments in frontier modelling and efficiency measurements”, Australian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 39, 219-245. 
 
Coelli, T.J. (1996), “A guide to FRONTIER version 4.1: a computer program for stochastic frontier 
production and cost function estimation”, Department of Econometrics, University of New England, 
Armidale, Australia. 
 
Coelli, E.G., Rao, D.S.P. and Battese, G.E. (1998), “An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity 
Analysis”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston/Dordrecht/London. 
 
Cowie, J. and Asenova, D. (1999), “Organization form, Scale Effects and efficiency in the British bus 
Industry”, Transportation, 26, 231–248. 
 
Cowie, J. (2002), “Acquisition, efficiency and scale economies: analysis of the British bus industry”, 
Transport Reviews, 22, 147–157. 
 
Chang, K.P. and Kao, P.H. (1992), “The relative efficiency of public versus private municipal bus firms: An 
application of data envelopment analysis”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 3, 67–84. 
 
Charnes, A., Cooper, W.W. and Rhodes, E. (1978), “Measuring the efficiency of decision making units”, 
European Journal of Operating Research, 2, 429–444. 
 
Dalen, D.M, and Gomez-Lobo, A. (2003), “Yardsticks on the road: Regulatory contracts and cost efficiency 
in the Norwegian bus industry”, Transportation, 30(4), 371–386.   
 
De Borger, B. and Kerstens K. (2000), The performance of Bus-transit operators, (chapter 36) in David A. 
Hensher & Kenneth J. Button (eds): Handbook of Transport Modeling, Pergamon: Amsterdam. 
 
De Borger, B., Kerstens, K. and Costa A., (2002), “Public transit performance: what does one learn from 
frontier studies?” Transport Reviews, 22(1), 1–38.  
 
Deprins, D., Simar, L. and Tulkens, H. (1984) “Measuring Labor-efficiency in post offices”, in The 
Performance of Public Enterprises: Concepts and Measurement (Eds) M. Marchand, P. Pestieau and H. 
Tulkens, Elsevier Science Publishers BV, North Holland, Amsterdam, 243–67. 
 
Farrell, M.J (1957), “The measurement of Productive Efficiency”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society A, 
120, 253-281. 
 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S. and Lovell, C. (1985), The measurement of efficiency of production. Kluwer Nijhoff 
Publishing: Boston. 
 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S. and Lovell, C., (1994), Production frontiers. Cambridge University Press: New York 
Greene, W.H. (1995), Limdep User’s Manual and Reference Guide, version 7.0, Econometric Software, 
Bellport, N.Y.,  
 
Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, C.A.K. (1995), “A note on the Malmquist Productivity Index”, Economic Letters, 
47, 169–175. 
 
Grosskopf, S. (2003), “Some remarks on productivity indexes”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 20, 459–
474. 
 
Jondrow, J., Lovell, C.A.K., Materov, I.S. and Schmidt, P. (1982), “On estimation of technical inefficiency 
in the stochastic frontier production model”, Journal of Econometrics, 19, 233-238. 
 
Kerstens, K. (1996), “Technical efficiency measurement and explanation of French urban transit 
companies”, Transportation Research Part A, 30, 431–452. 
 Lovell, C.A.K. (2003), “The decomposition of Malmquist productivity indexes”, Journal of Productivity 
Analysis, 20, 437–458. 
 
Meeusen, W. and van de Broeck, J. (1977), ”Efficiency estimation from Cobb-Douglas production functions 
with composite error”, International Economic Review, 18, 435-444. 
 
Migué, J-L. and Bélanger, G. (1974), “Toward a General Theory of Managerial Discretion.” Public Choice, 
17, 27-47. 
 
Odeck, J. (2000), “Assessing the relative efficiency and productivity growth of vehicle inspection services: 
An application of DEA and Malmquist indices”, European Journal of Operating Research, 126, 501–514. 
 
Odeck, J. (2006), “Congestion, ownership, region of operation, and scale: Their impact on bus operator 
performance in Norway”, Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 40(1), 52–69. 
 
Odeck, J. and Alkadi, A. (2001), “Evaluating efficiency in the Norwegian bus industry using Data 
Envelopment Analysis”, Transportation, 28, 211–232. 
 
Odeck, J. and Bråthen S., (2002), “Toll financing in Norway: the success, failures and perspectives for the 
future”, Transport Policy, 9, 253 – 260 
 
Odeck, J. and Bråthen S., (2008), “Travel demand elasticities and users attitudes: A case study of Norwegian 
toll projects”, Transportation Research Part A, 42, 77-94. 
 
Office of the Audutor General of Norway (OAGN) (1999), “Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av 
vegmyndighetenes styring av fem utvalgte bompengeprosjekter” [In English: Study by the Office of The 
Auditor General of the Road Authorities’ management of five selected toll-road projects], Riksrevisjonen 
Dokument nr. 3:3, Oslo, Norway. 
 
Rees, R. (1985a), “The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part 1”, The Bulletin of Economic Research, 37, 3-27. 
 
Rees, R. (1985b), “The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part 2”, The Bulletin of Economic Research, 37, 75-
97.  
 
Ruggiero, J. and Vitaliano, D.F. (1999), “Assessing the efficiency of Public Schools Using Data 
Envelopment Analysis and Frontier Regression,” Contemporary Economic Policy, 17(3), 321–331. 
 
Seiford, L.M. (1996), “Data envelopment analysis: the evolution of the state of the art (1978-1995)”, Journal 
of Productivity Analysis, 7, 99-137. 
 
Simar, L. and Wilson P.,  (2007), “Estimation and Inference in Two-stage, Semi-Parametric Models of 
Production Processes”, Journal of Econometrics, 136, 31 – 64. 
 
Tulkens, H. (1993), “On FDH Efficiency Analysis: some Methodological  Issues and Applications to Retail 
Banking, Courts and Urban Transit”, Journal of productivity Analysis,  4, 183 -210. 
 
Tulkens, H. and  Vanden Eeckaut (1995), “Non-Parametric Efficiency, Progress and Regress Measures for 
Panel Data: Methodological Aspects”, European Journal of Operating Research, 80, 474 -499. 
 
Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. (1988), “Privatization. An Economic Analysis.” MIT Press, London. 
 
Viton, P.A. (1997), “Technical efficiency in multi-mode bus transit: A production frontier analysis”, 
Transportation Research Part B, 31 (1), 23–39. 
 
Welde, M. Odeck, J., Bøe, R.F. and Bråthen, S. (2003), “A comparision of non-profit toll companies and 
Build Operate Transfer initiatives – the case of Norway”. Proceedings from the European Transport 
Conference, Strasbourg, France. 
 
Welde, M. and Amdal, E. (2006), “En analyse av driftskostnadene ved bompengefinansiering”, 
Vegdirektoratet, Teknologiavdelingen. Rapport nr 2456. 
